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Governance

Explore the mechanics of TRON On-Chain Governance and the protocol’s evolution through Super Representative voting. This technical guide explains how network parameters are modified, the lifecycle of TRON Improvement Proposals (TIPs), and the decentralized recovery mechanisms that ensure network liveness.

SR submits proposal → 27 active SRs vote →
threshold reached → change activates at next available maintenance period

TRON governance is SR-exclusive at the proposal and vote level. Regular TRX holders participate indirectly by choosing which SRs hold voting power. This is the intended design of DPoS: stake holders elect representatives, representatives govern.

StageDurationDetails
Active3 daysSRs can cast approval votes
ApprovedImmediateIf ≥19 of 27 SRs approve within 3 days
ExpiredAfter 3 daysIf threshold not reached, proposal fails silently
ExecutedNext maintenance period6-second governance event at end of Epoch

Governance proposals can modify any protocol-level parameter. Examples of parameters that have been changed through governance:

ParameterDescription
Energy cost per byteAdjusts the base cost of smart contract execution
Bandwidth cost per byteAdjusts the cost of simple transfers
Block rewardTRX minted per block for SRs
Vote rewardTRX distributed to voters per block
SR candidate depositRequired TRX deposit to register as an SR candidate
Maximum CPU time per transactionExecution time limit per transaction
Adaptive Energy upper boundCap on the total Energy available network-wide

All current and historical proposals are visible on TRONSCAN:

  1. Navigate to tronscan.org
  2. Select BlockchainGovernance from the top menu
  3. The Governance page lists active, approved, and expired proposals with vote counts and the specific parameter change proposed

As a TRX holder, you participate in governance by choosing which SRs to vote for. SRs with a published governance stance — how they intend to vote on protocol changes — allow you to align your votes with your preferences.


Before a formal on-chain proposal, changes are typically discussed through TRON Improvement Proposals (TIPs) — public documents submitted to the TRON GitHub repository (github.com/tronprotocol/tips).

Anyone can submit a TIP or comment on one. The TIP process provides:

  • Technical discussion before committing to an on-chain proposal
  • Community feedback from developers and users
  • A public record of the rationale behind each change

Reviewing active TIPs is the best way to stay ahead of upcoming protocol changes that may affect staking yields, transaction costs, or smart contract behavior.


The Nakamoto Coefficient (NC) is the minimum number of independent entities that would need to collude to compromise a blockchain network — halt it, reverse transactions, or force through a malicious protocol change. A higher number means the network is harder to capture.

TRON’s Nakamoto Coefficient is 14. Here is how that number is derived and what it actually means.


TRON uses Delegated Proof-of-Stake with 27 active Super Representatives producing blocks in rotation. To control the actual content of the blockchain — deciding which transactions are included and in what order — a colluding group needs to control a simple majority of SR slots:

Total SRsMajority thresholdMinimum colluding SRs
27>50% (>13.5)14 (= 51.85% of SRs)

14 is the smallest integer greater than 27 ÷ 2. With 14 SRs under coordinated control, a coalition can:

  • Determine which transactions are included in blocks
  • Censor specific addresses or contracts
  • Control network liveness (block production and therefore chain progress)

Note: 14 SRs alone cannot unilaterally pass governance proposals — that requires 19 of 27 approvals. But 14 controls the ledger itself.


There is a second, separate threshold that is often confused with the Nakamoto Coefficient: the finality disruption threshold.

TRON’s consensus is BFT-augmented DPoS. A produced block is not final until it is solidified — acknowledged by at least 19 of 27 SRs via PBFT-style attestations. The 19-SR requirement follows directly from the “two-thirds majority” rule: ⌈2/3 × 27⌉ = 19.

If 9 or more SRs refuse to broadcast attestations, only 18 honest signatures can accumulate. Since 18 falls one short of the required 19, no block becomes irreversible:

ThresholdSRs requiredWhat it means
Block solidification19 of 27Minimum attestations for a block to become irreversible
Finality disruption9 of 27Fewest non-participating SRs that prevent solidification
Block production control14 of 27Majority of block slots — the Nakamoto Coefficient

These are two completely separate threat vectors:

  • 9 SRs going offline disrupts finality. Blocks are still produced on schedule — the chain keeps moving — but no block becomes irreversible. Transactions enter the chain but remain un-finalized until the faulty SRs are replaced.
  • 14 SRs colluding compromises content. The attacker controls which transactions are valid, can censor addresses, and can create forks. This is the DPoS equivalent of a 51% attack.

Halting finality is a less costly attack to mount than controlling block content. The NC of 14 specifically measures the more impactful threat.


A common misconception is that TRON fails the same way as “pure” PBFT systems such as Tendermint (Cosmos).

  • Pure PBFT: If >1/3 of nodes (9) fail, the chain stops completely. No new blocks are produced. Recovery requires a coordinated view-change protocol or a hard fork.
  • TRON DPoS: If 9 SRs fail, the chain keeps moving. It falls back to “Longest Chain” consensus (similar to Bitcoin) until the 19-SR finality threshold is restored.

The recovery mechanism: TRON’s 6-hour Epoch acts as a decentralized circuit breaker. If 9 SRs are blocking finality, TRX holders can vote them out. A new SR set is then elected during the next maintenance period (the 6-second event at the end of each Epoch). Once a 19th responsive SR is elected, block solidification resumes automatically — starting from the oldest unconfirmed block and catching up to the tip of the chain — without any protocol change or hard fork.


The SR set is elected by TRX holders staking for TRON Power. A secondary dimension of decentralization is how concentrated voting power is: if a small number of large TRX holders collectively control enough votes to elect 14 or more SRs, they can influence the SR set itself. This is distinct from the SR Nakamoto Coefficient but related to the overall security model.

On-chain vote distributions are publicly visible on TRONSCAN’s SR voting page.


MetricTRONBitcoinEthereum
Nakamoto Coefficient14~4 (Mining Pools)~3–5 (LSTs)
Consensus TypeDPoS (High Liveness)PoW (Probabilistic)PoS (BFT-Safety)
Failure ModeFinality lag at 9; Control at 14Control at 51% HashrateHalt at 1/3 Stake

TRON’s raw NC of 14 is higher than most leading PoW or PoS networks. The important caveat: DPoS validators are a known, named set — coordination among a small group is logistically simpler than among anonymous miners. This is a structural trade-off of DPoS: high throughput and a measurable NC, at the cost of a smaller, identifiable validator set.


A Nakamoto Coefficient of 14 means that no single entity controls the network. 14 independent SR operators would have to coordinate — without detection or defection — to compromise TRON. While 9 entities can slow the time-to-finality, the integrity and liveness of the blockchain remain secure until 14 entities are fully captured.

Follow TIPs

Active proposals and technical discussions are public on github.com/tronprotocol/tips. Subscribe to stay informed about upcoming changes.

Choose SRs carefully

Research each SR’s governance voting history on TRONSCAN before allocating your TP. SRs that vote against community interests can be replaced by shifting votes.